By John Lindstrom
Publisher
Posted: March 24, 2016 4:15 PM

Our colleagues at Bridge Magazine have published a tribute to former Governor William Milliken as he approaches his 94th birthday on Saturday.

Written by Dave Dempsey, who earlier wrote a well-received biography of Mr. Milliken (and whose father Jack was director of the then-Department of Social Services under Mr. Milliken) the piece focuses on Mr. Milliken’s record of promoting and protecting Michigan’s environment.

The article has been shared on social media and drawn fond remembrances of Michigan’s longest-serving and now longest-living governor. Former House Speaker Gary Owen, probably as blue a blue-dog Democrat as ever, posted that Mr. Milliken was the only Republican for governor he voted for. “A man who wanted to do the best he could for everyone,” Mr. Owen said.

It is serendipitous that the piece comes out the day after the Flint Water Advisory Task Force issued its report blasting state government, and by implication Governor Rick Snyder, for its failures in the Flint water crisis.

Mr. Milliken endorsed Mr. Snyder in the last two elections, and Mr. Snyder has praised Mr. Milliken. And both have had some similar experiences in their time in office.

In particular, both had a major crisis involving toxic substances. Mr. Snyder of course has had the Flint situation with lead contaminated drinking water.

And Mr. Milliken had the PBB crisis, when cattle feed contaminated with polybrominated biphenyls affected the state’s food chain in the 1970s.

As one of the few reporters who has covered both crises I have thought much about Flint and PBB, how they occurred, how the state reacted. One crisis now is old enough to reflect on what may have been the final outcomes; the other is still new enough that it will likely take decades before any final effects are tallied. There are similarities and stark differences between the two.

First, the origins of the two crises. PBB was a purely industrial calamity that state government had to step in to resolve. No government officials poured a compound that was supposed to be sold as a fire retardant into feed and shipped it off to Michigan farmers who then fed it to their cows (and also chickens, pigs, sheep). That was all done by workers in a Michigan Chemical factory owned by private enterprise.

Flint cannot claim the same parentage. Flint is a government-made crisis, and it is primarily a state-government made crisis. There are no similarities in any way to the two crises’ origins (emergency managers were named to help Flint get through its financial mess, PBB was a total screw-up) and neither are there any similarities to who was to blame.

There similarities in initial government response to the crises. State government, particularly the then-Department of Agriculture, was slow to react to growing evidence of a problem affecting dairy cattle in the early days of the PBB crisis. But it was almost more a sense of disbelief, and a suspicion – wrong as it turned out – that the problems may be due to the individual farm management. Not every farm was affected in the state, because not every farm used the tainted feed. Plus, the agriculture industry worried about the possible impact the crisis could have as did the department.

Like Flint, with PBB there were scientists who warned there was a problem, and who faced bureaucratic resistance. Like Flint, it took scientists showing ongoing problems to really force the state into action.

Once the crisis was proven, there was fallout for some top state officials, just as there has been with Flint. B. Dale Ball, who died at 94 in 2010, and who had been a well-respected director of the Agriculture Department, was helped into retirement because of the crisis.

What then are the differences? Well, the potential size and scope for one. The Flint crisis seems at this time to be limited primarily to the city. At the time the PBB crisis potentially affected everyone in the state. With the passage of decades the total health effects of PBB are still not completely known, though there are some signs negative effects may not have been as widespread as feared. With Flint, the biggest fears are what potential effect the contamination could have on the city’s children and their future lives, and how the city will recover from the crisis.

To this reporter, the biggest difference seems the overall response of government and the public. Which speaks to how both have changed.

Both Mr. Milliken and Mr. Snyder took responsibility for their respective crises. Yet, when looked in the total context of how each crisis developed, the Snyder administration has fumbled and struggled more. PBB took some time to become a reality; in Flint, when the city switched to the Flint River as its drinking water source, people complained almost immediately. The complaints were not about lead at first, no one knew about lead contamination.

It did take time for the state to recognize PBB. Once it was realized, state government accepted it had a problem it had to address.

From the beginning Flint’s water was a problem, yet government not only did not react, it was dismissive. Even when top administration officials raised concerns – generally when a top official raises a concern, one expects the bureaucracy to respond – there was pushback against them.

Then, there is the overall tone of how officials responded. Neither Bill Milliken nor Rick Snyder caused their crisis. If anyone had cause to blame and castigate a bad player, it was Mr. Milliken. Yet in public, he did not look back, he did not assign blame. There were problems that needed fixing, he said, but to my memory he never called out Michigan Chemical or its corporate parent, Velsicol.

Mr. Snyder has said local, state and federal government share in the blame for Flint. He has done so to the point the task force he appointed criticized him for doing so. The issue is not that Mr. Snyder is not correct to a degree, but to what purpose does his criticism serve?

Finally, the biggest difference in how government has reacted is how bitterly partisan Flint has become compared to PBB. Oh, in 1978 Democrats tried to make Mr. Milliken directly responsible for the PBB crisis during the election. Tried, but failed. The public didn’t buy it.

But in response, Republicans did not accuse the Democratic Legislature of sitting on its hands in response to PBB.

With Flint, both parties have made the water crisis a political issue and showered criticism on each other unceasingly.

Which brings the last point: how the public has reacted. The 1970s was a cynical time, after Watergate, assassinations, Vietnam. And those directly affected, particularly the farmers, were understandably angry at state government. Yet, the public overall seemed to expect and feel that government would respond and take care of the issue. In part that was because it had seen both parties in Lansing and Washington try to work together to resolve problems.

No such confidence exists now with the public. Decades of partisan dysfunction and an overwhelming cynicism has shattered any sense of trust in government. It is more than a partisan breakdown in the public, there is a real sense that government cannot solve the problem it created, and may not care to.

One could ask which governor you would rather have in charge during the Flint crisis. But it is a useless question.

One could better ask why did state government not learn the lessons of the PBB crisis. One could ask, and should, if Mr. Snyder and the Legislature will take their cue in solving Flint from the tone Mr. Milliken and lawmakers of 40 years ago took in solving PBB.